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WORDS THAT BIND: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE GROUNDS OF 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY. By John Arthur. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 1995. Pp. viii, 236. Cloth, $77.50; paper $23.50. 
For some time now, discussions of judicial review and constitu-
tional interpretation have been held hostage to partisan political 
debate. On the one hand, political conservatives urge judges to 
stick to the so-called "original intentions" of the Constitution's au-
thors when making constitutional decisions. On the other hand, 
political liberals challenge judges to peer behind the words and to 
engage the "spirit of the Constitution." It would be difficult to 
overstate the stakes of the debate. Unfortunately, however, it often 
seems that no one knows what these phrases mean or what their 
concrete implications for constitutional interpretation are. 
John Arthur's Words that Bind1 takes a valuable step toward 
clarifying our understanding of judicial review. Arthur discusses ju-
dicial review as a topic in its own right, independent of result-driven 
politics, and asks what can be said for and against various promi-
nent theories of constitutional interpretation. Consequently, Words 
that Bind is an excellent place to begin piecing together the ab-
stract, complex issues involved in judicial review. The book will be 
especially useful for readers with an undergraduate-level back-
ground in modern analytic philosophy. 
At 236 pages, Words that Bind is a relatively short work. Never-
theless, its scope is comprehensive. In successive chapters Arthur 
covers theories of original intent, proceduralism, the critical legal 
studies movement, Utilitarianism - including a discussion of the 
law and economics school - and contractualism. The book is well 
written and the philosophical concepts involved are clearly 
explained. 
There is more to Words that Bind than can be covered in this 
review. Arthur's book is primarily a work of legal philosophy; thus, 
I confine myself to addressing the philosophical issues he raises. It 
should be noted, however, that Words that Bind contains much that 
would be of interest to the intellectual historian, and this review 
ignores the book's historical content. 
Arthur makes short work of his first target - constitutional 
originalism. Constitutional originalists make some version of the 
familiar claim that when a dispute arises about the meaning of a 
constitutional provision, it should be interpreted as the Framers 
1. John Arthur is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Program in Philosophy, 
Politics, and Law at Binghamton University. 
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originally intended it to be interpreted.2 For example, if the Fram-
ers regarded thumb screws, but not executions, as cruel and unusual 
punishment, then the Eight Amendment should be read to prevent 
the states or Congress from imposing the former but not the latter 
form of punishment. Originalists tend to be moral skeptics who put 
great stock in majority rule. In particular, originalists seek to pre-
vent judges from imposing their subjective preferences and values 
on the majority. Originalists also tend to see the Constitution as a 
kind of contract or covenant among the people; they believe the 
role of the judge is to enforce the terms of the contract on behalf of 
the people. Judges act consistently with the ideal of democratic 
governance when they stick closely to the Constitution's text, tie 
their decisions to history, and refrain from creating new rights. In 
other words, judges should decide disputes in accordance with the 
terms of the agreed-upon constitutional contract, not replace that 
contract with something they happen to think preferable. 
Arthur catalogs originalism's well-known woes (pp. 7-43), and 
in so doing makes a convincing case against it. For instance, if the 
Constitution is a contract, in what sense can we be, said to have 
consented to it? Certainly most of us have not expressly accepted 
its terms. If we somehow tacitly consent to the constitutional con-
tract, what is the relationship between our tacit consent and original 
intent? Most of us are in no position to answer the historical ques-
tion of what was in the minds of the Framers at the time of the 
Constitution's ratification.3 Even historians cannot agree about 
such matters. How can we be said to have consented to the specif-
ics of the Framers's original intentions, then, when most of us have 
at best a very general, hazy idea of what those intentions might 
have been? 
Even if we can be said to have consented to the Framer's origi-
nal intent, it is far from clear that originalism can provide judges 
with a coherent definition of the phrase "original intent.'' Accord-
ingly, it is far from clear that originalists can provide judges with a 
clear set of instructions for actually deciding cases. For example, 
judges need to know who should be counted among the Framers in 
order to determine their original intentions. The Framers, however, 
could be the actual constitutional drafters, everyone attending the 
constitutional convention, or all those who ratified the Constitution. 
Another problem arises when one attempts to discover a univo-
cal "intention" of any of these groups of "Framers." Even if the 
2. For a useful discussion of the loosely related ways in which originalists have character-
ized their theories, see GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND TIIE CONSTITUTION 17-
37 (1992). 
3. For an interesting historical perspective on the actual intentions of the Constitution's 
Framers, see generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: Pouncs AND IDEAS IN TIIE 
MAKING OF TIIE CoNSIITUTION (1996). 
1512 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1510 
"original intent" behind a constitutional clause is identified with 
whatever the majority of the Framers would have said its meaning 
was, there is simply no reason to believe a "group intention" must 
exist for any clause. People can vote for the same provision for 
sharply divergent reasons. Thus, absent some reason to think that 
the group defined as the Framers had a majority position concern-
ing the meaning of each disputed clause of the Constitution, 
originalism may have trouble getting off the ground. 
Arthur moves on to a second, and initially more promising, the-
ory of judicial review - democratic proceduralism (pp. 45-73). 
Like originalism, proceduralism places heavy emphasis on the value 
of majority rule and the need to hold in check judges who, if uncon-
strained, would impose their personal values on others. 
Proceduralism parts company with originalism at the suggestion 
that the Constitution should be read as a contract, the terms of 
which we can fairly be said to have accepted. According to the 
proceduralist, the role of judge is not to enforce a contract, but 
rather to ensure that the democratic process has worked properly. 
Proceduralists start with the assumption that democratic political 
processes are self-legitimating; thus, whatever laws ultimately 
emerge from fair and open democratic elections are necessarily just 
laws. No matter what a judge thinks of the wisdom of a given piece 
of legislation, the law cannot be rejected on constitutional grounds 
if it is the result of a genuinely democratic process. Put another 
way, democratic proceduralists sees constitutional interpretation as 
an exercise in what John Rawls called "pure procedural justice."4 
Arthur's main complaint against proceduralism is its inability to 
protect minority interests from tyranny by the majority (pp. 62-68). 
Suppose a duly elected legislature passes laws undermining certain 
fundamental rights of a despised minority. The government takes 
care, however, not to undermine the democratic processes in which 
the minority members may participate. For example, the majority 
preserves the rights of minority members to vote, hold political of-
fice, and exercise freedom of speech. The fundamental problem for 
proceduralism is that as long as this hypothetical situation is the 
result of a regular, open, and fair election process, there is little the 
proceduralist can say to condemn it. 
Proceduralists may attempt to blunt the criticism by appealing 
to the constitutional doctrine of strict scrutiny under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. At least when it impacts certain groups, burden-
some legislation will be carefully scrutinized to make sure that it is 
necessary for achieving a compelling state interest. Thus, our legal 
system provides some built-in protection against the kind of legisla-
tion in question. 
4. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85-86 (1971). 
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Arthur argues that appealing to strict scrutiny in this context 
undermines the proceduralist's view of judges as neutral parties 
who refrain from imposing their personal views on others (pp. 66-
68). Consider the example of a judge asked to decide whether a 
state's anti-sodomy law burdening homosexuals violates equal pro-
tection.5 The judge must first determine if homosexuals are a dis-
crete and insular minority. Arthur argues that this determination 
cannot be made independently of the judge's personal view of ho-
mosexuality (p. 67). ~omosexuals will seem prejudiced and strict 
scrutiny triggered if the judge believes that there is nothing wrong 
with homosexual acts between consenting adults. If, on the other 
hand, the judge believes that homosexual acts are an illegitimate 
form of sexual expression, laws against such acts will not seem to be 
the result of mere prejudice and the judge will not invoke strict 
scrutiny. Arthur's example suggests that proceduralism will not be 
able to honor its commitment to judicial neutrality without a signifi-
cant revision of current constitutional law. 
Arthur explores some of the ways in which proceduralists might 
try to overcome their inability to protect the fundamental interests 
of minorities (pp. 68-74). For example, the proceduralist might in-
sist that all citizens be granted an equal opportunity to influence the 
political process, thus enabling the proceduralist to challenge dis-
criminatory laws on the basis of their inevitably negative impact on 
access to the political process (pp. 71-72). But whatever success the 
proceduralist can expect to have with such a move, an underlying 
problem remains: proceduralism focuses on the wrong thing. The 
failings of discriminatory laws are not limited merely to their ad-
verse effects on the political process. Violations of minority rights 
would be objectionable even if the violations did not affect the 
political process. Proceduralism fails to give us a way to capture 
this point. 
Arthur's treatment of the critical legal studies (CLS) movement 
in his third chapter may strike the reader as a bit idiosyncratic. 
While it is difficult to give a nutshell version of CLS, CLS propo-
nents tend to see the rule of law as illusory. Statutes and case law 
do not constrain judges in any meaningful sense; judges are free to 
reach whatever decisions they like on almost any basis they like. In 
a phrase, the law is "indeterminate." Legal Realists made similar 
claims years ago.6 Unlike Legal Realism, however, CLS does not 
use the personalities and individual traits of particular judges to ex-
plain legal decisions. Instead CLS stresses the political and ideolog-
5. Due process concerns with such a law were presumably settled in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 {1986) {finding no due process violation). 
6. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222 {1931). 
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ical tensions at work in the law. As a result, CLS adherents tend to 
view judicial review in starkly political and pragmatic terms - judi-
cial review is a tool for social change; judges should acknowledge 
their nearly unfettered decisionmaking power and then use that 
power to fashion a better world (p. 81 ). 
CLS must contend with a crucial question: Why do its propo-
nents think that the law is indeterminate? Arthur suggests the an-
swer is that CLS is really a form of moral skepticism (pp. 86-88). In 
particular, CLS proponents do not believe that legal, conventional, 
or human rights exist. They believe that talk about political rights is 
merely an expression of personal, subjective preferences on the part 
of the speaker. Th.ere can be no correct answers in disputes about 
rights, much as there can be no correct answers when children de-
bate whether vanilla is a better flavor than chocolate. Thus, legal 
decisions balancing one - nonexistent - right against another are 
no more than unconstrained acts of judicial will in thin disguise. 
Arthur's answer to all of this is relatively straightforward. Using 
the action of an ideal observer as a foil, he points out that noncogni-
tivist moral philosophers long ago developed a variety of ways that 
allow us to provide correctness conditions for statements that are at 
bottom nothing more than expressions of a speaker's attitudes.7 
Thus, even if one were to grant that rights discourse is essentially a 
subjective matter, it would be fallacious to infer that any notion of 
correctness is therefore inapplicable to rights talk. Statements con-
cerning rights are meaningful according to the noncognitivist, it is 
just that the conditions under which those statements are correctly 
assertable are not what moral realists would take them to be. In 
other words, if CLS is trading on the idea that no statement about 
the existence or applicability of a legal right can be correct because 
such statements simply express the preferences of judges and advo-
cates, then CLS has gone too far. 
Arthur's diagnosis of CLS's ills is not compelling. The 
noncognitivist strategies he describes are so old hat at this point 
that one has to wonder if a raw, unsophisticated moral skepticism 
could really be what drives the CLS movement. Surely at least 
some CLS proponents have absorbed the noncognitivist lessons 
contained in almost any decent introductory ethics textbook pub-
lished in the last thirty years.8 If Arthur is correct, then the very 
existence of CLS can be neatly explained by the amusing thought 
that CLS's guiding lights failed to pay attention in their college eth-
7. By the "correctness conditions" of a statement, I mean simply those conditions that 
would have to obtain for the statement to be correctly assertable. 
8. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, EnnCAL THEORY 211-14 (1959). For an up-to-date 
discussion of noncognitivism and the notions of correctness, truth, and objectivity, see Ste-
phen Darwell et al., Toward Fin de si~cle Ethics: Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REv. 115, 144-52 
(1992). 
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ics courses. I submit that there is more to CLS than Arthur allows, 
although I will be the first to admit that I am not entirely certain 
what more there is. 
Chapter Four contains a lengthy discussion of utilitarianism and 
its application to judicial review. Utilitarianism is a theory of the 
right. In particular, utilitarians believe that to determine what the 
morally right act is in a given situation, one ranks possible states of 
affairs by their levels of utility; the right act is the act that brings 
about the highest ranked state of affairs. What "utility" refers to is 
a heavily debated issue among utilitarians. Arthur argues that util-
ity is best understood as experiences that are desirable, rather than 
those that satisfy desires or promote economic efficiency, defini-
tions used by law and economics scholars. 
Arthur employs rule utilitarianism to explore the notion of judi-
cial review from the utilitarian's perspective. A utilitarian might 
argue that instead of looking directly at the consequences of indi-
vidual acts, judges should seek to make their decisions in accord-
ance with the rule that would maximize utility if followed generally. 
Utilitarian judges would normally follow past legal precedent be-
cause of the need to maintain the institutional integrity of the judi-
cial system in combination with the fact that judges will recognize 
their relatively limited abilities to evaluate the ultimate conse-
quences of a given rule. In certain clear cases utilitarian judges will 
put these scruples aside and overturn laws that obviously burden 
the general welfare, but such cases are likely to be rarities. 
Utilitarianism's Achilles' heel, argues Arthur, is what it leaves 
out of its account of moral and judicial reasoning (pp. 140-43). Is 
torture cruel and unusual punishment according to the utilitarian? 
Let's say that it can be proven that widely televised torture has a 
terrifically strong deterrent effect and that society would experience 
a net gain in utility by publicly torturing its criminals. Utilitarians 
would then agree that such torture is an appropriate form of pun-
ishment because it maximizes welfare. This analysis, however, 
leaves something out, viz., many people share the intuition that it 
would be wrong to torture criminals whatever the utility calcula-
tions show. Torture is an affront to human dignity. Human dignity 
may not be the dispositive consideration in deciding whether our 
society should employ torture, but that is not the point. The point 
is that it is a consideration and it is a consideration ignored by the 
utilitarian calculus. The best that the utilitarian can do is to treat 
the desire to preserve human dignity as one more desire to be 
weighed against all other desires. Thus the utilitarian is not in a 
position to account for typical intuitions about the importance of 
human dignity. Of course, the utilitarian is free to deny the moral 
significance of dignity. But for those of us who wish to treat moral 
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intuitions as data to be explained by a moral theory, rather than 
explained away, utilitarianism is not a satisfying normative basis for 
an account of judicial review. 
Arthur's final chapter reveals his sympathies for democratic 
contractualism. Arthur recommends contractualism as a way to ac-
count for what utilitarianism could not account for, namely, the in-
trinsic value of certain fundamental rights. Under Arthur's version 
of contractualism, we are to think of the Constitution as akin to a 
Rawlsian social contract (p. 155). A social contract is justified if it 
would be agreed to by people communally deciding how to struc-
ture a society but who are ignorant of all the factors that distinguish 
them as individuals. In other words, a distribution of wealth and 
rights is legitimate just in case it would be chosen from Rawls's 
"original position." 
Unfortunately, Arthur does not clearly state how contractualism 
relates to judicial review. For one thing, it is entirely implausible to 
think that the United States Constitution is rooted in contractual-
ism. It strains credulity to think that the members of the constitu-
tional convention were ignoring the fact that they were white, male 
property owners. The political circumstances surrounding subse-
quent amendments of the Constitution do not approximate the 
ideal of Rawls's original position to any greater degree. 
Furthermore, even if one were to believe that the Constitution 
is a product of contractualist philosophy, contractualism says very 
little about how the Constitution should be interpreted. Arthur 
considers capital punishment and the right to privacy from the con-
tractualist standpoint, but his contractualist vision offers no unique 
insight into these topics. Consequently, contractualism's powers to 
help solve the dilemmas of judicial review seem quite limited. Con-
tractualism may be an interesting moral theory, but it leaves much 
to be desired as either a descriptive or prescriptive theory of judi-
cial review in our legal system. 
Although Words that Bind occasionally lapses and becomes too 
vague to be informative, the book's strengths overcome its weak-
nesses. For the most part, it is clear, scholarly, and well written. 
Anyone interested in the foundations of judicial review and who 
has a basic background in modem philosophy can find something 
worthwhile in this book. 
- John A. Drennan 
